President Urged to Tighten Interception Authorization, Strengthen Oversight of Telecommunications Operators, and Accelerate Police Reform
Jakarta, 4 November 2026 — The Policy and Regulatory Institute (PRI) urges President Prabowo Subianto to undertake a comprehensive reform of the state’s communications interception system following allegations of abuse of interception powers involving several senior police officials. The case must serve as a catalyst for improving interception authorization and oversight mechanisms, strengthening the accountability of law enforcement institutions, and ensuring that state powers are not used for unlawful purposes
PRI Executive Director Arisakti “Rico” Prihatwono said the central issue is not merely who allegedly carried out the illegal interception, but how the existing system allows such abuses of power to occur without adequate oversight.
“If even the President’s communications are suspected of having been illegally intercepted, what about ordinary citizens, politicians, journalists, activists, and businesspeople? The question is not only who carries out the interception, but who authorizes it, who oversees it, and who ensures that these powers are not abused,” Rico said.
According to Rico, advances in interception technology enable law enforcement institutions to access communications through telecommunications networks as well as directly through targeted devices. These capabilities place enormous power in the hands of the institutions using them. Without external oversight, abuses can occur through systems that appear technically legitimate.
PRI proposes three reform measures that the government should take without delay.
First, establish an independent oversight mechanism for all official interception centers, including those operated by the Indonesian National Police (Polri), the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), and other institutions vested with statutory interception powers.
Oversight must include audits of the legality of interception requests, identification of the officials granting authorization, system access logs, the management of intercepted material, and investigations into suspected abuses. The oversight body must have access for audit purposes, investigative powers, and independence from the institutions it oversees.
“Institutions with interception powers must not also be the sole arbiters of whether their own interception activities are lawful. It makes no sense to entrust oversight of such extensive powers entirely to the institutions exercising them,” Rico stressed.
PRI also emphasizes the importance of overseeing interception conducted through telecommunications operators’ networks. Oversight must extend beyond the institutions requesting interception to cover the mechanisms for activating, accessing, logging, and terminating interception within telecommunications infrastructure.
“Law enforcement personnel must not be able to activate interception through operators’ networks without lawful authorization and a verifiable audit trail. Every request must be recorded, have a legal basis, be time-limited, and be subject to independent audit,” Rico said.
PRI proposes requiring telecommunications operators to verify the completeness of authorization documents, maintain tamper-proof records of interception activities, and provide independent oversight bodies with access for inspection in accordance with the law. Operators must also have mechanisms to reject requests that do not meet administrative requirements.
However, an operator’s technical involvement does not automatically establish that it knew of or consented to illegal interception. Legal responsibility must be clearly distinguished among the requesting institution, the official granting authorization, and the operator carrying out the interception.
“Oversight must cover the entire interception chain, from the officials issuing the orders to the systems executing them. If we oversee only law enforcement personnel while leaving interception infrastructure without independent audits, reform will fail to address the root of the problem,” Rico stressed.
Second, PRI urges the government and the House of Representatives (DPR) to revise legislation governing interception by introducing judicial oversight. As a matter of principle, every interception undertaken for law enforcement purposes must receive court approval based on clear legal grounds, a specific target, a limited duration, and the principle of proportionality.
Rico cited practices in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the United States, the interception of communications for criminal investigations under Title III generally requires a judicial order. The United Kingdom, meanwhile, applies a “double-lock” mechanism under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, requiring authorization by a competent official and approval by a Judicial Commissioner for certain categories of interception.
“In those countries, it is not enough for law enforcement personnel simply to assert that interception is necessary. They must explain its legal basis and obtain approval through a mechanism separate from those conducting the operation. Indonesia needs to move toward similar standards,” Rico said.
He added that narrowly defined exceptions may be permitted in urgent circumstances, but must remain subject to subsequent judicial review. Such a mechanism is necessary to prevent interception from being used as a tool for political rivalry, pressure against groups within society, or information gathering for purposes unrelated to law enforcement.
PRI also calls on the government to clarify the rules governing the use of sophisticated interception tools, including technologies capable of accessing communications devices directly without relying on conventional interception mechanisms within operators’ networks.
“Interception technology is developing far faster than the regulations governing it. If oversight covers only interception through operators, while law enforcement personnel can use other tools to take control of a person’s communications, there will always be loopholes for evading oversight,” Rico said.
Third, PRI calls on President Prabowo to accelerate implementation of the police reform agenda previously formulated by the Commission for the Acceleration of Police Reform. The commission submitted its recommendations to the President in May 2026. However, progress in implementation and the tangible results of those reforms are considered insufficiently visible to the public.
“The President has received the recommendations for police reform. The public now needs to know what has been implemented, what remains pending, and who is responsible. The reform commission must not end up merely producing a report while fundamental problems concerning police powers and accountability remain unchanged,” Rico said.
PRI proposes that the President establish a reform implementation agenda with deadlines, performance indicators, and periodic progress reports. Priorities must include oversight of police intelligence activities, controls on interception technology, accountability for the exercise of coercive powers, and improvements to the relationship between Polri and oversight bodies.
Within this framework, PRI also urges the revitalization of the National Police Commission (Kompolnas). The institution must be strengthened to enable it to oversee the police more effectively, including by obtaining access to necessary information, investigating suspected abuses of power, and ensuring that oversight recommendations are acted upon.
“Kompolnas must not remain an institution that merely provides advice or receives complaints without the ability to ensure follow-up. If the President wants police reform to succeed, Kompolnas must have meaningful oversight powers and adequate operational independence,” Rico said.
According to Rico, reforming Kompolnas must go hand in hand with strengthening judicial oversight and independent audits of interception systems. The three serve distinct but complementary functions: courts grant authorization, authorized institutions carry out interception, and independent oversight bodies ensure compliance with the law.
“Police reform must not stop at replacing officials, rotating personnel, or taking action against individuals. Reform must address the structures of authority and oversight mechanisms that allow misconduct to occur,” Rico added.
PRI stresses that investigations into the alleged illegal interception must extend to those who ordered and carried it out, as well as those who received and used the intercepted material. Taking legal action against a number of individuals will not resolve the problem if the system that enables abuse remains intact.
“If only a few people are punished while the interception apparatus continues to operate without independent oversight, the same problem can recur. Genuine reform is not merely about changing who controls the system, but ensuring that whoever controls it cannot act arbitrarily,” Rico concluded.